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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Deductions For Legal Education
Welsh v. United States and Condit v. Commissioner
Income tax deductions for education expenses have normally been
sought under section 162(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code1 and
its predecessors.2 Two recent cases, Welsh v. United States3 and Condit
v. Commissioner* indicate the problems encountered by individuals5
attempting to secure deductions for legal education.
Welsh, an Internal Revenue agent assigned to the Intelligence
Division, sought a deduction for his expenditures in attending law
1. INT. Rev. CoDE op 1954, § 162(a). "There shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carry-
ing on any trade or business .. "
2. Beginning with Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 214(a) (1), 43 Stat. 269.
3. 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), aff'd per curiam, CCH 164 STAND. FD.
'TAX RgP. (64-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) ff 9318 (6th Cir. 1964).
4. 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1306 (1962), aff'd per curiam, CCH 1964 STAND. FD.
-TAX Rtp. (64-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) ff 9317 (6th Cir. 1964).
5. "Whether professionals may deduct the costs of gaining further knowledge in
their field as 'ordinary and necessary' business expenses is a question which has vexed
-the courts since the 1920's." 6 STAN. L. Rzv. 547 (1954).
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school at night. He was not enrolled in any particular program that
would enhance his familiarity with tax problems, but rather was pur-
suing the ordinary law school curriculum. Several of his co-workers
were pursuing the same program. In his law school application, he
indicated an intent to practice law; that is, to enter an entirely new
profession. A few months after passing the Ohio bar, he left the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and entered private practice. Never-
theless, Welsh's request for a deduction was allowed. Welsh convinced
the court that his primary purpose in undertaking the eduction was
to maintain and/or improve his skill as an Internal Revenue agent and
not to enter a new profession.
In holding that Welsh's primary purpose was improvement in the
skills needed in his job, the court had to overcome two points asserted
by the government. First, as to Welsh's avowed intent to practice law,
the court took judicial notice of the fact that people, in filling out
applications, will often express themselves in a manner that will most
likely please the reader. Also, his intent could have changed by the
time the education was actually begun. Second, as to Welsh's quick
departure from the IRS to private practice, the court decided that peti-
tioner's intent, at the time he undertook the education was to stay with
the IRS, and that it is quite common for an individual to vacillate
before deciding upon a career.
Condit, a combination office manager, accountant, and assistant
treasurer, was in frequent contact with lawyers through workmen's
compensation claims and contract negotiations. Condit's answer to
questions concerning his future plans on his law school application were
the same as Welsh's; but before matriculating in law school, he re-
quested permission to take only those courses which would be of direct
assistance to him in his work. The request was denied, and petitioner
undertook the regular law school curriculum. After passing the bar,
Condit remained with the same employer. Nevertheless, the deduction
was denied, the court holding that he intended to qualify for a new
position.
Both of Condit's arguments were summarily dismissed. The fact
that he remained with the same employer was held to be of no legal
significance because a person can remain at his job, and, in his pursuit
of education, be motivated by a desire to better himself for purposes
of promotion or to obtain a position with the sane employer as a
lawyer. The fact that he requested particular courses was held to be
unimportant, the court ruling instead that there was no showing that
the courses actually undertaken were directed to the improvement and
maintenance of skills (a point deemed irrelevant in the Welsh case).
The court also found that the answer on the application form relating to
post-graduation plans was a factor to be considered in determining the
petitioner's primary purpose.
It has been said that until the decision in the Welsh case (1962),
''one proposition seemed certain in the area of educational deductions.
The expenses of attending law school were not deductible." 6 The real
6. 17 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 424, 425 (1963). See Shaw, Education as an Ordinary
and Necessary Expense in Carrying on a Trade or Business, 19 TAx L. Rev. 1 (1963).
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impetus to the more liberal approach was the 1958 Regulations,7 which,
while easing the availability of deductions, have produced a labyrinth
of confusing decisions based on "slight factual nuances and seemingly
'indistinguishable distinctions'. ... 8 As one comment writer rather
discouragingly noted, ". . . the post-Regulations developments have
demonstrated, . . . [that] the area of eduction expenses is peculiarly
resistant to the drawing of precise lines."' The Welsh and Condit
cases justify these apprehensions.
Perhaps, the reason for these seemingly contradictory results is
that each case turns on the taxpayer's ability to sustain his burden of
proof. In order to be allowed an educational deduction, the taxpayer
must affirmatively prove that his primary purpose, at the time he
undertook the eduction, was to maintain and/or improve the skills
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)-(b) (1958). The Regulations read as follows:
"(a) Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are deductible if
they are for education (including research activities) undertaken primarily for
the purpose of:
(1) Maintaining or improving skills required by the taxpayer in his
employment or other trade or business, or
(2) Meeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's employer, or the
requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition
to the retention by the taxpayer of his salary, status or employment."
Whether or not education is of the type referred to in subparagraph (1) of this para-
graph shall be determined upon the basis of all the facts of each case. If it is customary
for other established members of the taxpayer's trade or business to undertake such
education, the taxpayer will ordinarily be considered to have undertaken this educa-
tion for the purposes described in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph. Expenditures
for education of the type described in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph are de-
ductible under subparagraph (2) only to the extent that they are for the minimum
education required by the taxpayer's employer, or by applicable law or regulations,
as a condition to the retention of the taxpayer's salary, status, or employment.
Expenditures for education other than those so required may be deductible under
subparagraph (1) of this paragraph if the education meets the qualifications of sub-
paragraph (1) of this paragraph. A taxpayer is considered to have made expendi-
tures for education to meet the express requirements of his employer only if the
requirement is imposed primarily for a bona fide business purpose of the taxpayer's
employer and not primarily for the taxpayer's benefit. Except as provided in the last
sentence of paragraph (b) of this section, in the case of teachers, a written statement
from an authorized official or school officer to the effect that the education was
required as a condition to the retention of the taxpayer's salary, status, or employment
will be accepted for the purpose of meeting the requirements of this paragraph.
"(b) Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are not deductible
if they are for education undertaken primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new
position or substantial advancement in position, or primarily for the purpose of
fulfilling the general educational aspirations or other personal purposes of the
taxpayer. The fact that the education undertaken meets express requirements
for the new position or substantial advancement in position will be an important
factor indicating that the education is undertaken primarily for the purpose of
obtaining such position or advancement, unless such education is required as a
condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his present employment. In any
event, if education is required of the taxpayer in order to meet the minimum
requirements for qualification or establishment in his intended trade or business
or specialty therein, the expense of such education is personal in nature and
therefore is not deductible."
For an interesting Tax Court discussion of the Regulations, see Cosimo A. Carlucci,
37 T.C. 695, 698-700 (1962). See also Loring, Some Tax Problems of Students and
Scholars, 45 CALIIP. L. Rgv. 153, 153-57 (1957).
8. Goldman, Recent Decision on Educational Expense Arouses Controversy;
Liberal Trend Slowed, 17 J. TAXATION 40 (1962).
9. Shaw, supra note 6, at 9.
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required by him in his employment."° If the court finds the taxpayer's
primary purpose was to either obtain a new position, to enhance his
opportunities for promotion or salary increases, to fulfill his personal
educational aspirations, or to serve any other personal purpose, then a
deduction will be denied." The best way for the taxpayer to indicate
that his primary purpose was to maintain and/or improve his skills is
to show that the education was customary for other established members
of his trade or business.'" If primary purpose cannot be shown through
customariness then the taxpayer must adduce other evidence to support
his claim.'
3
In the Welsh case, for example, the court, ruling on the taxpayer's
primary purpose, was satisfied with his proof that he never intended to
leave the government service, since the security it offered was necessary
for his health, Welsh having suffered seriously as a result of the war.
The court felt that the private practice of law did not satisfy this need,
but that the government service did. In attempting to explain, then,
why Welsh did leave the IRS for private practice shortly after passing
the bar, the court discussed its impression of the taxpayer:
"The case was heard before the Court without a jury, and this
Court had the opportunity to listen to the testimony of the tax-
payer and observe his demeanor upon the stand. His credibility
was called squarely into issue, and this Court finds his testimony
logical, consistent and true."' 4
The Condit case, on the other hand, seems a stronger one for a
deduction, since the taxpayer remained with the same employer and
10. See the Welsh case supra note 3, and Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1), supra
note 7.
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), supra note 7.
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (a), supra note 7.
13. See generally Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 69, 70. The Commissioner
suggests the following order of questions to determine the deductibility of educa-
tional expenses:
"Has the taxpayer met the minimum requirements for qualification or estab-
lishment in his intended position?
If 'no,' no deductions are allowable.
If 'yes,' is education undertaken primarily to meet employer requirements to
retain taxpayer's position?
If 'yes,' the taxpayer is entitled to deductions unless (1) the education leads
to qualifying the taxpayer in his intended trade or business and taxpayer
knew of this employer requirement before assuming his position with his
employer, or (2) the employer's requirement is imposed primarily for the
benefit of the taxpayer and not primarily for a bona fide business purpose.
If 'no,' is it customary for other established members of taxpayer's trade or
business occupying positions similar to that of the taxpayer to undertake
education of the type pursued by the taxpayer?
If 'yes,' the taxpayer is considered to have undertaken education for the pur-
pose of maintaining or improving needed skills and is entitled to deductions.
If 'no,' the taxpayer must show by other means that his primary purpose was
to maintain or improve needed skills. If the education undertaken meets
express requirements for a new position or substantial advancement, the
taxpayer must show that the education was not undertaken primarily for
the purpose of meeting those requirements." Id. at 74.
14. 210 F. Supp. 597, 599 (N.D. Ohio 1962). Accord, Sabino F. Ciorciari, 22
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 784, 785 (1963). "Petitioner impressed us as a conscientious person,
sincerely interested in doing a good job, who regarded seriously the official encourage-
ment to take additional courses."
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requested permission to take only certain courses - both of which
arguments weigh against a conclusion that his primary purpose was to
qualify for a new position or satisfy any other personal goals. The
court, however, questioned the significance of the former argument
holding that Condit's primary purpose could have been to become a
lawyer while still remaining with his present employer. Had Condit
shown that his employer in fact hired outside lawyers only, this finding
would have been obviated.
In the recent case of Richard M. Baum, 5 petitioner, an insurance
claims adjuster and evening law student, did show that the com-
pany's legal work was handled only by lawyers engaged in private
practice. In support of its finding that Baum's primary purpose was
maintenance and improvement of skills, the court relied on two other
additional factors: petitioner's proof that his intention was to remain
with the same company and his showing that legal education was custo-
mary among claims adjusters employed by the company.
It is interesting to note that petitioner's attorney in the Welsh
case failed to mention the fact that legal education was common in
Welsh's department of the IRS, but, nevertheless, the court, in grant-
ing the deduction, did recognize the customariness of the eduction.16
Condit was not as fortunate. Being the only person employed in his
particular capacity, coupled with the fact that his area of responsibility
was unique, he could not have produced evidence indicating that legal
education was customary among people similarly employed." As stated
above, none of the other evidence offered by Condit was sufficient to
support deductibility.
The importance of showing customariness is illustrated by two
cases very similar to Welsh and Condit, William J. Brennan8 and
James J. Engel.'9 Both petitioners were employed by the IRS. Brennan
held a higher classification and dealt more closely with attorneys than
did Engel, but both did considerable legal work for which courses
were offered within their respective departments. Both petitioners en-
rolled in law school after indicating an intent to enter the private
practice of law. Upon graduation, Engel remained with the IRS and
Brennan departed for private practice. Engel's deduction was denied
and Brennan's was granted.
In Engel's department of the IRS, employees were encouraged by
the supervisor to take law courses, and also a notice was posted by
the employer explaining the regulations and tax deductions accruing
to an employee if his primary purpose was improvement of job skills.
15. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Rep. [Dec. 26,654; CCH Tax Ct. Mem.] (1964).
16. 210 F. Supp. 597, 599 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
17. But see John S. Watson, 31 T.C. 1014, 1016 (1959), where the court belittled
the importance of affirmatively proving customariness. Compare the recent Maryland
case Walter T. Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Rep. [Dec. 26,688; CCH Tax Ct. Mem.]
(1964), where petitioner, an accountant employed by his father, was the only member
of the accounting firm to have received a law degree. Yet, a deduction was granted
upon proof that many accountants, including leaders in the field, had completed law
school and still remained in their original capacities - an indication that legal educa-
tion has been and can be used for purposes of maintenance and improvement.
18. 22 CCH Tax Ct. Merm. 1222 (1963).
19. 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1962).
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But despite these encouragements, only eight of the seventy-five people
in Engel's department decided to attend law school. Three others
already had their degrees. The court held that this percentage was
inadequate to be considered customary, and petitioner was unable to
produce other facts indicating a satisfactory primary purpose.
In Brennan's department of the IRS, all employees had obtained
or were in the process of obtaining their law degrees. The court, tem-
porarily ignoring the easy solution based on customariness, engaged
in a desultory analysis of other factors that might be relevant to the
petitioner's primary purpose. To support this analysis the court observed
that the ". . . summit of knowledge, like the fruit of Tantalus is never
reached," 2 but realizing that this adage was of somewhat doubtful
legal significance, reverted to its original feeling that customariness
was the best indicator of Brennan's primary purpose."
It must be remembered that customariness, as a factor in the
ascertaining of the taxpayer's primary purpose, is only one point to
be considered in the over-all analysis of each case.2 2 In fact, situations
frequently arise in which deductions are denied even though the
education is not only customary but compulsory. The combined cases
of Sandt v. Commissioner and Hines v. Commissioner" illustrate this
point. Both petitioners were research chemists, who were told that
they would become patent chemists if they first agreed to attend law
school. Upon graduation, they would then become patent attorneys.
This procedure was followed by all employees desiring promotion to
patent work. Yet it was obvious, despite the customariness, that the
primary purpose of both taxpayers was to qualify for the new position
rather than to improve present skills.
In two other cases involving patent work, John Lezdey2 4 and
Robert H. Montgomery, 5 legal education was likewise customary.
Here, both taxpayers had been promoted to their new positions after
a substantial part of their education was completed, and it was the skills
of this new position which the education did in fact improve. A deduc-
tion was sought for only those expenses accruing subsequent to the
promotion. In denying the deduction, the court looked only to the time
of the commencement of the education to determine primary purpose,
which was held to have been the fulfillment of personal intellectual
aspirations, and, obviously, could not have been improvement of skills
required in a position not yet obtained.
Perhaps, these four decisions can be reconciled with those in which
customariness was present and the deduction was allowed. The Revenue
Ruling26 suggests that the first question to be posed to resolve all
20. 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1225.
21. Accord, Douglas R. Fortney v. Campbell, CCH 1964 STAND. FVD. TAX RAP.
(64-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) J 9489 (N.D. Tex. 1964). Petitioner's showing that fifteen out
of seventeen persons employed in his department of the IRS held law degrees con-
tributed to the allowance of a deduction.
22. For other factors see note 13 supra.
23. 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962).
24. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Rep. [Dec. 26,714; CCH Tax Ct. Mem.] (1964).
25. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Rep. [Dec. 26,754; CCH Tax Ct. Mem.] (1964).
26. Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 69 supra note 13.
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problems in this area is whether minimum requirements for the intended
trade or business had been met.27 If not, no deduction will be granted.
This criterion applies easily to Sandt and Hines where the petitioners,
as research chemists without law degrees, had clearly failed to meet
the basic qualifications for employment as patent attorneys. 28 Compar-
ing Welsh and Brennan, we find that petitioners intended to remain
at their present position, for which they had met minimum require-
ments, and thus the customariness standard could be applied to prove
primary purpose.
In at least one instance, Donald P. Frazee,29 a deduction was
allowed even though the legal education was not customary. 30 The
petitioner, a civilian Air Force employee engaged in writing numerous
regulations as well as policy and procedure documents, was the only
person so employed attending law school. The court held that Frazee
had adequately shown, through other means, that his primary purpose
was to maintain and improve the skills required in his employment.3 '
The apparent inconsistencies encountered throughout the area of
income tax deductions for legal education expenses is largely traceable
to the failure of the courts to pinpoint the crucial factors. Too few of
the cases have stressed the criteria of customariness, meeting minimum
requirements, or sustaining the burden of proof which, in truth, have
been the basis for many of the decisions. However, even if these
factors were clarified, the area would still remain "peculiarly resistant
to the drawing of precise lines"32 since the ascertainment of primary
purpose when customariness is not involved, is dependent to a great
extent upon the court's subjective impression of the petitioner.
Barrett W. Freedlander
27. Ibid.
28. The only case in which this criterion is discussed as a factor in the granting of
a deduction is Milton L. Schultz, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Rep. [Dec. 26,940; CCH Tax Ct.
Mem.] (1964).
29. 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1963).
30. Even though the taxpayer can prove his primary purpose by means other than
customariness there is no question that he is seriously handicapped by being unable
to satisfy this criterion. In Welsh, taxpayer won without a showing of customariness,
but the court did take judicial notice that customariness did, in fact, exist. Frazee is
the only case in which a taxpayer has won without the presence of customariness.
31. Unable to succeed in similar circumstances was Louis Aronin, 20 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 909 (1961), an NLRB examiner, who attended the University of Baltimore
Law School. The education was not shown to be customary and petitioner was unable
to prove in any other way a satisfactory primary purpose. Compare Joseph T.
Booth III, 35 T.C. 1144 (1961). Perhaps the most difficult case in this entire area
of educational expense deduction is David H. Pfeffer, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 785(1963), where of four or five men similarly employed, "some" attended law school.
The court, in denying the deduction, gave only passing notice to this possible custo-
mariness. Instead, it relied on the fact that petitioner entered private practice upon
completion of his education, a fact completely overlooked in Welsh and Brennan. The
court itself doubted the correctness of its decision (p. 787) and held:
"The judicial ascertainment of someone's subjective interest or purpose motivat-
ing actions on his part is frequently difficult. One method by which such ascer-
tainment may be made is to consider what the immediate, approximate, and
reasonably to be anticipated consequences of such actions are and to reason that
the person who takes such actions intends to accomplish their consequences. This
reasoning is implicit in the Latin maxim 'acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta,'
and in the more homely English adage 'actions speak louder than words'."
32. Shaw, supra note 6, at 9.
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